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According to a growing number of influential critics, the prevailing
federal income tax laws have become highly inequitable and are an ob-
stacle to economic growth. In seeking more equitable and neutral taxes,
many have proposed a thorough overhaul of the codes. Prominent
among the proposals are two congressional plans, Bradley-Gephardt
and Kemp-Kasten, and two Treasury plans, Treasury I and the Presi-
dent’s tax proposals of May 1985, hereafter referred to as Treasury II. In
attempting to correct the perceived problems i~n the current internal rev-
enue codes, each of the four proposals would alter both the distribution
of the income tax burden and the incentives that the codes bestow on
savers or investors. Each proposal contains its distinctive compromises
in balancing equity against investment incentives.
This paper examines how each of the four proposals for federal
income tax reform might alter investment spending by changing the
taxation of corporate income. As a first step toward assessing the poten-
tial influence of these plans on capital formation, this approach isolates
the effects of their changing: (i) corporate income tax rates, (ii) formulas
for depreciation allowances, (iii) investment tax credits, or (iv)
allowances for the deduction of corporate dividends from taxable prof-
its. This study is not a comprehensive evaluation of the basic principles
behind each plan, nor does this study consider how these reforms may
influence capital formation by altering households’ propensities to save,
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by modifying the real after-tax yields in credit markets, or by changing
the rate of growth of GNP. This paper also does not consider how great
investment spending ought to be.
The Bradley-Gephardt proposal, often called the Fair Tax, appears to
be designed primarily to achieve a specific standard of equity in measur-
ing and taxing income. This plan does not necessarily attempt to en-
hance or even sustain the levels of investment incentives offered by the
current revenue code. Not surprisingly, then, this study finds that Bradley-
Gephardt fosters less investment spending than either the current rev-
enue code or the other three tax reform proposals. Supporters of this
plan apparently believe the best policy is to tax income "equitably," and
then rely on other fiscal policies or monetary policy, if necessary, to
encourage the desired rate of capital formation.
The Kemp-Kasten proposal, by contrast, appears to be designed
primarily to achieve a specific standard of neutrality in taxing invest-
ment income. By doing so, it may better integrate corporate and person-
al income taxes. This study concludes that Kemp-Kasten fosters more
investment spending than current tax law, and it may enhance capital
formation as much as the Treasury plans.
The Treasury plan of late 1984 shares some of the philosophy behind
both the congressional plans. Treasury I sought a "fair" tax by closing
loopholes and by attempting to tax only economic income. At the same
time it strives for a more neutral tax treatment of investments and a
greater integration of corporate and personal taxes. According to the
results of this study, the Treasury I proposal may foster the least invest-
ment during its first decade, because some of its investment incentives
are introduced slowly. But over longer intervals, this plan should en-
courage a rate of capital formation exceeding that of current law and
rivaling that of the Kemp-Kasten plan.
The Treasury II plan, introduced in 1985, is similar to Treasury I in
many respects. But this second plan does not integrate the corporate
and personal taxes nearly as much as the first, nor does it offer some of
the features of Treasury I that were designed to measure and tax eco-
nomic income consistently. This plan initially may encourage more in-
vestment spending than Treasury I, but in the long run both Treasury I
and the Kemp-Kasten plan may foster more capital formation.
The first section of this paper describes some of the problems of
defining a "neutral" tax. The second section introduces the four tax re-
form proposals. The macroeconomic consequences of these proposals
on business capital spending are examined in the third section, and
some of the industry-specific consequences are described in section four.
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What Is a Neutral Income Tax?
Since the inception of the science, economists have recognized that
tax rules may not be neutral, because they can alter the relative prices
among goods, the allocation of resources, or the distribution of income.
According to many of today’s neoclassical theories, even the simplest of
income taxes hinders business capital formation by fostering consump-
tion spending and by encouraging investors to purchase consumer dur-
ables, owner-occupied dwellings, or other assets that yield implicit
income which escapes taxation. If the income tax code also includes a
corporate income tax that has not been integrated properly with the
general personal income tax, business_investment spending may be de-
terred all the more.1 Consequently, the prevailing revenue code is not
regarded as a neutral tax.
According to the most stringent standards, for a tax to be neutral
neither the relative prices of goods and services nor the allocation of
resources should depend on tax rates or other features of the tax rules.
By this severe definition, no tax is neutral, so policymakers have turned
to a variety of less demanding standards. For example, considering only
the direct consequences of taxing the returns on capital, a neutral tax
might levy equal effective tax rates on all investments; it might leave the
relative "take-home pay" on investments unchanged; or it might not
alter the relative costs of using capital goods. Because no tax satisfies the
stringent definition of neutrality, a revenue code that is neutral accord-
ing to one of these alternative definitions may not be neutral according
to the others under all circumstances. Furthermore, a revenue code that
is neutral in the context of one model of economic behavior may not be
neutral in another model, even though the definition of neutrality is the
same in both cases.
Even by the less stringent standards suggested above, the prevail-
ing income tax codes that apply to businesses are not neutral. A simple
neoclassical model of investment behavior may illustrate best both the
commonly mentioned problems with the current law and the types of
reform needed to make the revenue code more neutral among business
investments. In this model m firms each have invested in a specific
1See for example A. Auerbach, The Taxation of Capital Income (Harvard University
Press, 1983); M. Feldstein, Capital Taxation (Harvard University Press, 1983); and C. E.
Steuerle, Taxes, Loans, and Inflation (Brookings Institution, 1985)..
According to Keynesian theory, however, business capital formation need not be
hindered by such a reduction in the propensity to save. See, for example, the "paradox of
thrift," as described in J.M. Keynes, The General Theond of Employment, Interest, and Money
(Harbinger Book; Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1965), pp. 106 (last paragraph, Chapter
8), pp. 210-213 (first section, Chapter 13), pp. 358-371 (seventh section, Chapter 23), and
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machine tool. With no corporate income tax, each firm purchases this
equipment until the present value of the marginal revenue product for
the last machine equals the price of the machine:
P=~~NfMRP~/di f=l ..... m. (1)
The service life of this machine may vary among the firms (Nf), and the
streams of marginal revenue product ordinarily will not be the same for
many firms.2 For simplicity, all investors use the same set of discounts
(di).
The pattern of decay of the revenue product is the economic depre-
ciation of the machine tool. Although the physical decay of the tool, as
established by engineering studies, will be the same for all firms, the
rate of economic depreciation will vary across firms. Because different
industries expect different rates of technical progress in their production
techniques, the machine tool may have a shorter expected useful life-
span in some industries, while in others the machine may be expected to
sustain its productivity better in later years. Furthermore, different in-
dustries ordinarily use different types of labor skills or raw materials in
producing their specific goods or services. Consequently, differences in
the relative prices of labor, materials, or output that are expected to
prevail during the life of the machine will make the anticipated econom-
ic depreciation (as well as the measured decay of the marginal physical
product) of the machine vary across firms.
If a flat tax were levied on the revenue product of investments,
ignoring the general equilibrium adjustments, the direct effect of the tax
would be to reduce the net marginal revenue product and the demand
price for the machine proportionately for all firms:
P~=(1-~)~NfMRP//di=(1-~) P, f=l .....m. (2)
Under these very limited conditions, the tax is neutral among corporate
investors because the effective tax rate is the same for all, and the tax
does not directly alter the relative demand prices or returns prevailing
~These differences arise because of relatively imperfect or illiquid markets for used
capital goods. Three commonly mentioned grounds are: high transactions and installation
~osts; imperfect information about the quality of used capital (the possibility of "lemons");
and relatively high conversion costs (capital goods are frequently "customized" when first
installed). See also the observations concerning the problems with measuring the quantity
of capital goods cited at the end of footnote 3.
Of course, unless the firms never intend to sell these machine tools, (1) may misstate
the equilibrium condition. The equation fails to include the cost of reselling the machine.
For each firm, (1) implicitly states that the disposal value is the present value of the
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across corporations or investment goods.
The current tax rules that apply to businesses are more complicated
than this flat tax. The tax law specifies different rules for measuring the
taxable incomes of different firms or different types of capital goods, and
the law at times sets different tax rates for firms according to their size,
their legal status (corporation, proprietorship, partnership, cooperative,
or trust) or their line of business.
In the case of the machine described above, the m firms (all large,
profitable nonfinancial corporations) are taxed according to a statutory
measure of earnings (Ei) which does not necessarily match revenue
product. The firms also are entitled to claim investment tax credits (at a
rate k) and depreciation allowances (according to a schedule of rates,
Di, i = 1 .....T). Therefore, for the last machine purchased by each
firm:
P,= k P~ + ~Nf MRPif/di-’r(~lNfF-~/di- P~TDi/di).
Or, somewhat more simply
Pc = (1 - k) 1 (p _ ,~(~NfF~/di_ p~TDi/di)). (3)
Although the investment tax credit is widely regarded as an undis-
guised tax incentive, depreciation allowances appear to have some
grounds for representing business expenses. Because maintenance and
repair expenses are accounted for separately, depreciation allowances
represent the inevitable wasting of the asset, a kind of economic deple-
tion allowance or reserve. Without taxes, this depletion of the capital
asset is reflected in the pattern of decay of the revenue product. Other-
wise, there is no separate depreciation expense (other than maintenance
and repairs) to be considered in measuring the return on a specific in-
vestment. Nevertheless, businesses wishing to maintain their output
will establish a depreciation reserve: the decline in revenue product from
existing investments will require undertaking new replacement invest-
ments. The reserve, therefore, dictates how much of current profit must
be retained to purchase new capital if the firm is to conserve its size. In
this sense, the depreciation allowance is not to be deducted from rev-
enue product to measure the profitability of investment; instead, for
conservative or growing businesses it is a claim on cash flow for funding
new replacement investments. Consequently, depreciation allowances
may be interpreted not as a surrogate for business expenses incurred by
using existing assets, but as a delayed tax subsidy which may help fund
subsequent replacement investments or dividend payments to stock-
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The tax rules, as described in (3), would be neutral (in the less
stringent sense) over all investments qualifying for tax credits and
among all profitable corporate investors taxed according to these rules, if
the second term in the braces were proportional to the present value of
the stream of pretax marginal revenue product (P). Although the effec-
tive tax rates may vary across investments, the relative demand prices of
capital goods would not depend on the tax rate or other features of the
tax rules. But the schedule of depreciation allowances, fixed by law, is
not related to each firm’s stream of revenue product, and the pattern of
taxable investment income may be related only loosely to the revenue
product of capital. As a result, the second term in the braces probably
will not be proportional to P. Moreover, the rate of the investment tax
credit varies among investment goods. Consequently, in this simple
neoclassical model, the current corporate income tax is not neutral by
any reasonable standard.
Over the years tax policy advisors have suggested different reforms
for making the tax codes more neutral. The most sweeping suggestions
advocate the elimination of all business taxes or the complete integration
of corporate and personal income taxation. A second set of more modest
suggestions would require:
(i)    measures of taxable investment income (before deductions for
depreciation allowances) that match the revenue product of cap-
ital;
(ii) the elimination of the investment tax credit; and
(iii) the revision of depreciation schedules, either allowing investors
to deduct from taxable income the full price of investment
goods, at the time of purchase or specifying schedules of depre-
ciation allowances whose present values always equal the prices
investors pay for capital goods.3
3With these three measures, (3) becomes
P,= P-,r(P- P~)
As a result PT = P for all investment goods, for all firms. All three of these measures are
required to obtain this result. In particular, if (ii) were changed allowing businesses to
claim "economic depreciation," then the present value of depreciation allowances would
not equal the price investors pay for capital goods (P), and the tax law would not be
neutral. (In view of previous comments, it also is not clear that one schedule of "economic
depreciation" may be defined for each capital asset. Many common approaches seem to
appeal to the concept of "engineering depreciation.")
If the patterns of economic depreciation (the decay of marginal revenue products)
were identical for all firms, then neutrality need only require that depreciation allowances
correspond to this pattern of economic decay. (P.A. Samuelson, "Tax Deductibility of Eco-
nomic Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valuations," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 72
(December 1964), pp. 604-6.) This observation no doubt inspired the appeal to "economic
depreciation" in the Treasury I and Bradley-Gephardt proposals. Of course, this uniform
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Under either of these two sets of proposals (3) above becomes
P, = ElN~ MRP~f/di = P (4)
for all investment goods, for all firms. The effective tax rate for all invest-
ments, corporate and noncorporate, on the margin is zero (ignoring
personal taxes), and the relative prices of investment goods do not de-
pend directly on the corporate tax rules. The second set of proposals
would allow for a corporate income tax on the income of capital goods
that earn more than marginal returns.4 The corporate income tax would
become a tax on oligopoly profit or on the economic rent earned by
inframarginal investments whenever production functions exhibit de-
creasing returns for capital.
Whereas these two sets of proposals, by virtue of (4), would treat all
investment goods and investors the same on the margin, the simple flat
corporate income tax, which led to (2), would discriminate directly
against corporate investors in this model. With the flat tax, owners of
corporations would be taxed twice on their marginal investments, unlike
other investors who would pay, at most, only personal income taxes on
their returns.
Although the reform proposals that eliminate the corporate tax lia-
bilities for marginal investors may claim a degree of neutrality, they
appear to be unpopular for practical and theoretical reasons. The
"biases" against investment inherent in the corporate tax codes have
been well understood for decades. Yet, when lawmakers turn to the task
of fostering capital formation, they have sought the maximum "bang" in
investment spending per "buck" of tax revenue that they sacrifice. Re-
structure of interest rates, relative prices of goods and factors of production, etc.) for this
approach to be tenable. As explained before, these conditions probably are too strong to
be believed.
The reform suggested in (iii) would also require a change in the capital gains tax for
businesses. A firm selling an asset would report its receipts less the original price of the
asset plus accumulated depreciation allowances (all adjusted for inflation) as ordinary
taxable income.
The foregoing assumes that we can measure capital aggregates and therefore the price
and productivity of these aggregates. For a telling criticism of this assumption, see, for
example: D. Usher, ed., The Measurement of Capital (University of Chicago, 1980), esp. the
two papers comprising Chapter 7, M. Brown, "The Measurement of Capital Aggregates: A
Postreswitching Problem," and E. Burmeister, "Comment"; T. M. Stoker, "Completeness,
Distribution Restrictions, and the Form of Aggregate Functions," Econometrica, 52 (July,
1984), pp. 887-907; and C. Ichniowski, "Micro-Production Functions Aren’t Pretty: Firm-
Level and Industry-Level Specification for Inputs and Outputs," National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, working paper no. 1365, June 1984.
4See, for example, J. Sturrock, "Eliminating the Tax Discrimination Against Income
from Business Capital: A Proposal," in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Public Policy and Capital Formation, April 1981, pp. 281-302.110 Richard W. Kopcke
ducing the corporate tax rate is, therefore, the least attractive policy.
Lower rates would reduce the tax liability on income earned by past as
well as new investments, whereas more generous tax credits and depre-
ciation allowances may be limited to new investment projects alone.5
Furthermore, lawmakers have used tax credits, variations in depre-
ciation schedules, and specialized definitions of taxable income to foster
the demand for specific investment goods or to encourage the growth of
deserving industries and regions. Neutrality (in the less stringent sense)
apparently is not and perhaps should not be the single goal of tax policy.
Given that no revenue code can be fully neutral, a "second best" revenue
code may have a place for these traditional tax incentives in order to
compensate for some of the unavoidable biases inherent in any tax law.
Because tax revenues are used to finance public spending and govern-
ment operations, traditional tax incentives also may complement other
government policies, which are designed to alter the composition of
GNP, the allocation of resources, or the distribution of income.
Finally, economists, lawyers, accountants, and businessmen do not
agree with one another, or even among themselves, on the proper mea-
sure of the revenue product of capital goods. This dissension prevails
because the concept of revenue product is defined by and depends on
the specific economic model adopted. Without the perfect markets, the
prevalence of equilibrium, and the degree of certainty assumed in the
simple neoclassical model used above, for example, there is no unique
measure of revenue product. In fact, the all-important ex ante returns to
capital that influence investors depend on perceptions of future business
conditions; furthermore, the accurate measurement of ex post profit also
may depend on these intangible perceptions.6 In the absence of an en-
SSee, for example, R. Kopcke, "The Efficiency of Traditional Investment Tax Incen-
tives," in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Public Policy and Capital
Formation, April 1981, pp. 163-75.
6See, for example, the debate on measuring corporate profitability: B. Malkiel, "U.S.
Equities as an Inflation Hedge," in J. A. Boeckh and R. T. Coghlan, eds., The Stock Market
and Inflation (Dow Jones-Irwin, 1982), pp. 81-96; F. Modigliani and R. A. Cohn, "Inflation
and the Stock Market," in Boeckh and Coghlan, pp. 97-118; R. Kopcke, "Stocks Are Not
an Inflation Hedge," in Boeckh and Coghlan, pp. 45-58; and R. Kopcke, "The Continuing
Dedlne in Corporate Profitability and Stock Prices," New England Economic Review, July!
August, 1982. Of course the measurement of the profitability of capital presumes that the
quantity of capital can be measured. See the citations at the end of footnote 3 concerning
problems in defining economic aggregates such as the quantity of capital, the prices of
capital goods, and the productivity of capital.
If the stream of tax liabilities does not conform to the stream of revenue product in
the same way for every firm, the tax system ordinarily will not be neutral, especially as
economic conditions change. Therefore, as illustrated by the debates in the previous para-
graph, ex post measures of income that do not depend on ex ante estimates of future
fPierformance may misrepresent the profile of economic income. If taxable income is de- ned to be such an ex post measure of income, then the correspondence between the
streams of tax liabilities and revenue products will tend to vary across industries, and the
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during consensus, we could interpret the various measures of taxable
investment income as compromises among differing points of view.
Perhaps we should not expect to design an ideal income tax that, in
every respect, will be at least as "neutral" as any alternative proposal.
Our conception of neutrality is defined in terms of prevailing economic
theory, currrent and prospective business conditions, and the social ob-
jectives of lawmakers. This conception generally changes over time,
sometimes significantly, as our knowledge, our economy, and our social
goals evolve. Consequently, tax reform proposals are perhaps best re-
garded as steps toward a destination that itself changes with experience.
Some Current Proposals for Income Tax Reform
The accumulation of tax incentives and reforms over the years has
fashioned a tax code that many now regard as inequitable or an obstacle
to growth. This widespread dissatisfaction has bred a variety of propos-
als for income tax reform, four of which are examined below. Although
these proposals recommend many profound changes in the current tax
codes, the following analysis considers only changes in the taxation of
business income (table 1).
The Bradley-Gephardt Proposal
The Bradley-Gephardt plan would impose a uniform 30 percent tax
rate on all corporate income and repeal the ’investment tax credit. De-
pending on their "asset depreciation range" guidelines (established in
the Revenue Act of 1971), equipment would be assigned to one of six
classes with lives of 4, 6, 10, 18, 28, or 40 years. Structures would be
assigned to the 40-year class. For purposes of calculating depreciation
allowances, investors could use highly accelerated 250 percent declin-
ing-balance schedules over the assigned life spans of durable assets.
This formula for depreciation is designed to equate the present value of
these allowances with the present value of actual capital consumption
expenses, using a 10 percent discount rate. The Bradley-Gephardt pro-
posal would repeal the current $100 dividend exclusion and raise the
maximum capital gains tax rate from 20 percent to 30 percent.
This plan attempts to eliminate some "loopholes" or incentives in
the revenue codes while retaining others. It takes no significant step
toward the better integration of corporate and personal income taxes.
Although the corporate tax rate is reduced, the loss of the investment tax
credit and accelerated depreciation allowances (table 2) raises corporate
income tax liabilities compared to existing law and two of the three otherTable 1
A Comparison of Selected Provisions of Four Current Tax Reform Proposals
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Table 2
The Accumulation of Depreciation Allowances
Number of Years Needed to Recover:
1,,£ of 1/2 of 2/£ of
Purchase Price Purchase Price Purchase Price
Equipment
ACRS 13/4 21/2 31/4
Treasury I 23/4 41/4 61/4
Treasury II 23/4 21/2 31/2
Bradley-Gephardt 2 23A 41A
Kemp-Kasten 21/4 3 33/4
Structures
ACRS 4 61A 9
Treasury I 11 19 291/2
Treasury II 5 8 12
Bradley-Gephardt 5 81/2 131/4
Kemp-Kasten 4 61A 9
Note: Assuming 5 percent inflation, entries show the number of years t:equired for real depreciation
allowances to sum to the appropriate proportion of the average asset’s purchase price.
proposals. In terms of achieving neutrality (as discussed in conjunction
with equation (4) of the previous section), the Bradley-Gephardt plan
does not attempt to set the present value of depredation allowances to
the purchase price of assets. Instead, these allowances are linked more
closely to the engineering rate of decay of durable assets, assuming that
the sum of the inflation rate and real discount rate is about 7 percent.7
Variations in the expected rate of inflation not offset by variations in the
real discount rate could alter the relative tax treatment of many capital
assets.
This plan attempts to achieve a measure of fairness as defined by its
authors, not theoretical elegance as defined by common neoclassical
models of economic behavior.
The Kemp-Kasten Proposal
The Kemp-Kasten plan would impose a graduated corporate in-
come tax that attains a maximum tax rate of 35 percent on incomes
exceeding $100,000. This proposal also would repeal the investment tax
credit. For purposes of calculating depreciation allowances, durable as-
7The pretax 10 percent discount rate used to define allowances is a 6.7 percent nomi-
nal discount rate after corporate taxes.114 Richard W. Kopcke
sets currently assigned to 3, 5, 10, 15, or 18-year ACRS classes would be,
respectively, reassigned to 4, 6, 15, 20, or 25-year "neutral cost recovery"
classes. Depreciation allowances also would be indexed so that the eco-
nomic value of these allowances would not be diminished by rising
prices. This approach is intended to equate the present value of depreci-
ation allowances with the purchase price of durable assets, assuming a
3.5 percent real discount rate. Kemp-Kasten would repeal the $100 divi-
dend exclusion, and it would give taxpayers receiving capital gains a
choice of tax rules: either exclude 40 percent of these gains from income
taxation, or exclude from income taxation that portion of capital gains
that merely represents inflation.
The Kemp-Kasten plan attempts to achieve a more neutral tax treat-
ment of business investments. The repeal of the investment tax credit
and the adoption of depreciation allowances whose present value equals
the purchase price of durable assets (assuming a 3.5 percent real dis-
count rate) closely matches two of the three requirements for a neutral
tax presented in the previous section. These steps may well achieve a
better integration of the corporate and personal income taxes as well.
With the proper definition of taxable corporate income, they would
eliminate the corporate tax burden on the all-important marginal invest-
ments according to the neoclassical model.
Treasury I (November 1984)
The Treasury proposal would tax corporate income at a rate of 33
percent, after allowing corporations to exclude one-half of dividends
paid to stockholders from taxable income. The proposal would repeal
the investment tax credit and replace ACRS with the "real cost recovery
system" (RCRS). All durable assets would be assigned to one of seven
depreciation classes and receive an invariant annual depreciation rate
ranging from 32 percent to 3 percent. RCRS would permit businesses to
adjust their depreciation allowances each year for rising prices so that
the value of RCRS allowances would not vary with the changes in
prices. This Treasury plan would reduce the tax deduction that busi-
nesses as borrowers can claim for interest that they owe on their indebt-
edness. Borrowers would not be allowed to deduct interest expenses
that reflect the "inflation premium" in interest rates, and lenders would
not pay taxes on the inflation premium in their interest incomes. This
plan, like the previous plans, would repeal the dividend exclusion. The
maximum capital gains tax rate would be 35 percent, but taxable gains
would exclude the appreciation of assets due to inflation.
Treasury I shares some of the philosophy behind both the Bradley-
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grate corporate and personal income taxes better by allowing for a
considerable dividend deduction. It also strives for a degree of neutrality
by repealing the tax credit, reducing the corporate tax rate, indexing
depreciation allowances, interest income, interest expense, and capital
gains and by reducing somewhat the tax incentives for household in-
vestments in durables. But this Treasury plan also sought a "fair" tax.
Many of the measures above could be interpreted as dosing loopholes;
real depreciation allowances would be linked closely to the engineering
decay of assets; and the proposal would attempt to tax only economic
income.
Treasury II (May 1985)
The President’s tax proposals, submitted to Congress in May 1985,
feature a graduated corporate tax rate which rises from 15 percent to 33
percent for corporations with more than $75,000 of taxable income. This
plan (hereafter, Treasury II) would entitle corporations to deduct from
their taxable income one-tenth of dividends paid to shareholders. For
purposes of calculating depreciation allowances, the Treasury II plan
offers schedules that accelerate allowances somewhat more than the
schedules of the first plan. Durable assets would be assigned to one of
six classes with. depreciation rates ranging from 55 percent to 4 percent.
These allowances, like those of the first plan, would be indexed for
changes in prices. Finally, the Treasury II proposal would repeal the
dividend exclusion, but it would allow taxpayers to exclude one-half of
capital gains from their taxable income, and, beginning in 1991, taxpay-
ers could choose to exclude the portion of capital gains attributed to
inflation instead of using the flat 50 percent exclusion.
Treasury II is in many respects similar to the previous proposal. But
this second proposal does not integrate the corporate and personal taxes
nearly as much as the first. Instead, it offers more accelerated depreci-
ation allowances (table 2) to compensate for the reduced dividend de-
duction. This second plan also no longer proposes some of the features
of the first (such as indexing interest income and expense) that were
designed to measure and tax economic income more consistently.
The Macroeconomic Consequences of the Four Tax Reforms
In order to compare the potential influence on business capital
spending of the four tax reforms discussed above, this paper uses two
different descriptions of investment spending: the cash-flow and the
neoclassical models. A previous study found that these two approaches116 Richard W. Kopcke
"explained" the recent course of investment spending rather well.8 Ac-
cording to the cash-flow model, capital budgets rise and fall with the
supply of funds generated by retained earnings and depreciation
allowances. The neoclassical model uses business output, corporate in-
come tax rates, the value of tax credits and depreciation allowances,
interest rates, and the relative price of capital goods to explain invest-
ment spending. Although tax rules matter in both models, the cash-flow
approach says that investment reacts to changes in current business tax
liabilities, not future tax liabilities; whereas the neoclassical approach
says that investment responds to changes in the present value of current
and future tax liabilities.
The cash-flow model emphasizes liquidity constraints and uncer-
tainties about the future, while the neoclassical model emphasizes the
after-tax rate of return on investment over the life of the project. This
profound distinction can divide the two m_odels’ assessments of tax re-
form. All four proposals, for example, would twist the schedule of de-
preciation allowances; compared to ACRS, they would diminish the
deductions early in an asset’s life in favor of subsequent deductions.
According to the cash-flow model, this kind of reform would tend to
reduce cash flow, at least temporarily, thereby reducing investment
spending for a time. Should tax reform "stretch out" the schedule of
depreciation allowances too severely, the cash-flow approach may even
predict an enduring decline in business fixed investment. In a growing
economy, the volume of tomorrow’s new investments will exceed that of
today’s investments. Consequently, by the time investors begin to re-
coup the "postponed" depreciation allowances on today’s investments,
the postponed allowances on investments undertaken after today may
be great enough to prevent cash flow from regaining its former path at
any time during the future. Unlike the cash-flow model, the neoclassical
model weighs the promise of greater deductions in the future along with
today’s lower deductions, so it may predict greater capital spending than
the cash-flow model if ACRS were repealed. In fact, if tax reform intro-
duces indexing which enhances the value of future allowances suffi-
ciently, capital formation could even increase according to the
neoclassical approach.9
8R. Kopcke, "The Determinants of Investment Spending," New England Economic Re-
view, July/August 1985.
~l~his study does not use "effective tax rates" to assess the consequences of the various
tax plans, because all prominent descriptions of investment spending use various mea-
sures of sales, profit, the cost of capital, the return on investment, or the business cycle to
explain the demand for capital goods. Taxes surely matter, but they influence capital for-
mation only indirectly through profit, the cost of capital, or the return on investment. An
effective tax rate cannot even be defined unambiguously without an appeal to a specific
model of investment spending. Suppose, for example, a tax reform introduced an invest-
ment tax credit for construction expenditures but replaced ACRS with very conservativeTAX REFORM AND CAPITAL FORMATION 117
Tables 3 to 7 summarize the simulations of the cash-flow and neo-
classical models of investment spending over 20 years, running from
1981 to 2000. Although ACRS was enacted before these alternative pro-
posals were conceived, the simulations all begin at the same time to
compare the eventual effects of each plan, without giving ACRS the
benefit of a head start. In all simulations real GNP grows 3 percent per
year after 1984, and the rate of inflation, real rates of interest (after
taxes), dividend/price ratios on common stock, and the relative prices of
investment goods do not change after 1984.l° Corporate profits before
taxes and corporate dividend payments increase at the same rate as
nominal GNP.
Although these simulations of the growth of the capital stock can be
used to rank the four tax proposals against each other and against the
current tax law, this ranking depends on the economic assumptions
behind the simulations. For example, the rules that yield the greatest
rate of capital formation, assuming that inflation and GNP growth re-
main constant as is done here, may not retain top honors should the
economy experience sufficiently frequent or severe business cycles dur-
ing the next 15 years. In the past, cyclical variations in the rate of
inflation often altered the efficacy of investment tax incentives. Conse-
quently the various 20-year simulations of the tax reform proposals are
repeated three times in order to assess how changes in the rate of infla-
tion may alter the consequences of each proposal. (See the appendix for
depreciation schedules. This reform may be described as a tax cut, at least temporarily, by
the cash-flow model, but the neoclassical model could regard it as a tax increase. More-
over, in the context of the cash-flow model, no measure of an effective tax rate could
predict very accurately the response of investment spending to a tax reform unless this
measure essentially were defined to be cash flow; a similar conclusion applies to the
neoclassical model or any other prominent description of the demand for investment
goods. Therefore, according to the two approaches used in this article, the course of
business cash flow, sales, and the user cost of capital--not an effective tax rate--govern
the pace of capital formation.
See also A. Auerbach, The Taxation of Corporate Income, cited in footnote 1, esp. chap-
ters 2 and 3; and R. Kopcke, "Inflation, Taxation, and the Demand for Capital Assets,"
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89 (February I981), pp. 122-131.
~°Assuming that the real rate of interest (r) is constant implies that nominal yields
equal ( (1 + r)(1 + ~) - 1)/(1 - t), where ~ is the inflation rate and t is the marginal corporate
tax rate. Actual nominal yields typically have been less than those predicted by this for-
mula in the past. (This discrepancy is partly due to the difference between corporate and
personal income tax rates and to the lack of indexing in the corporate tax code. See R.
Kopcke, "Why Interest Rates Are So Low," New England Economic Review, July/August,
1980. The four tax proposals tend to reduce the difference among personal and corporate
tax rates, and, except for Bradley-Gephardt, they make the user cost of capital less sensi-
tive to the rate of inflation.) Should the real cost of funds tend to decline with rising
inflation in the future as it has in the past, the ranking of the proposals shown in tables 6
and 7 will not change drastically. The relative user costs do not change significantly with
changes in the real rate of discount as is illustrated by tables A-1 and A-2 in the appendix.118 Richard W. Kopcke
more details about the models and the simulations.)
None of these simulations admit "multiplier effects." If one tax plan
produced more investment spending than another, this additional in-
vestment would tend to foster a more rapid expansion of economic ac-
tivity, which, in turn, would stimulate even more investment spending.
By fixing the annual growth of GNP at 3 percent for all simulations, the
results below may understate the differences among the various tax
plans. Nevertheless, the basic ranking of the plans will not be altered by
this absence of multiplier effects.
Finally, this study does not examine the tax treatment of business
inventories. Under current law, businesses may account for the cost of
goods removed from their inventories using First-In-First-Out (FIFO) or
Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) methods. During periods of significant inflation
FIFO understates the cost of these goods, thereby creating "inventory
profits" on which businesses pay taxes. Although LIFO delays the pay-
ment of these taxes, this accounting method does not remove the poten-
tial tax liability on these inventory profits by revaluing inventories. Both
Treasury proposals would allow businesses to adjust the value of goods
taken from inventory for changes in prices due to inflation. Because the
value of inventories was not indexed during the 1970s and early 1980s,
the marginal tax rate on corporate profits may have been 20 percent
greater than that set by law.11 The following simulations may understate
the influence of the two Treasury proposals on capital formation by omit-
ting this treatment of inventory profits tax.
The Cash Flow Results
Under the conditions of the simulations, only the second Treasury
tax proposal generally increases investment compared to ACRS (tables 3
and 4). Treasury II’s lower corporate income tax rate, indexed depreci-
ation allowances, and modest dividend deduction more than compeno
11During the 1960s and 1970s the ratio of inventory profits (the inventory valuation
adjustment) to nonfinancial corporate profits with inventory and capital consumption
adjustments equalled roughly twice the inflation rate. (See R. Kopcke, "Are Stocks a Bar-
gain," New England Economic Review, May/June 1979, pp. 5-24, esp. p. 23.) Therefore, with
10 percent inflation, taxable corporate profits would be overstated by 20 percent. A more
modest inflation rate of 5 percent would increase the marginal tax rate on corporate profits
from 46 percent to almost 51 percent, by taxing inventory profits.
If, for example, the user costs described in the appendix were altered by replacing the
factor (1 - TAX) in the denominator by (1 - TAX (1 + 2~r)) for all tax schemes except the two
Treasury plans, then the user costs for ACRS, Bradley-Gephardt, and Kemp-Kasten would
be 6 percent greater with 3 percent inflation, 10 percent greater with 5 percent inflation,
and 14 percent greater with 7 percent inflation. Accordingly, the capital stocks for these
three tax schemes shown in tables 6 and 7 would tend to be reduced by 6, 10, or 14
percent, depending on the rate of inflation.Table 3
The Stock of Producers’ Durable Equipment--Cash-Flow Model
Billions of 1972 Dollars
ACRS Treasury I Treasury hi Bradley-Gephardt Kemp-Kasten
3 Percent Inflation after 1984
1980 615 615 615 615
1985 735 712 729 723
1990 932 882 916 869
1995 1087 1039 1075 997
2000 1197 !177 1208 1114
Average Annual
Growth Rate (Percent) 3.4 3.3 3.4 3,0
5 Percent Inflation after 1984
1980 615 615 615 615
1985 734 712 729 723
1990 913 873 907 858











2000 !132 1148 !177 1077 1116
Average Annual
Growth Rate (Percent) 3.1 3.2 3.3 2.8 3.0
7 Percent Inflation after 1984
1980 615 615 615 615 615
1985 734 711 728 722 719
1990 895 865 899 848 849
1995 1002 1000 1034 949 972
2000 1079 1125 1152 1048 1091
Average Annual
Growth Rate (Percent) 2.9 3.1 3.2 2.7 2.9
Note: See appendix for details.Table 4
The Stock of Nonresidential Structures--Cash-Flow Model
Billions of 1972 Dollars
ACRS Treasury I Treasury II Bradley-Gephardt Kemp-Kasten
3 Percent Inflation after 1984
1980 611 611 611 611 611
1985 688 661 666 665 663
1990 767 747 761 745 744
1995 868 843 862 829 834
2000 959 939 959 912 925
Average Annual
Growth Rate (Percent) 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.1
5 Percent Inflation after 1984
1980 611 611 611 611 611
1985 668 660 666 665 663
1990 761 744 758 741 741
1995 851 835 853 819 825
2000 929 926 945 896 911
Average Annual
Growth Rate (Percent) 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.0








Note: See appendix for details,
611 611 611 611 611
668 660 666 665 663
755 742 755 738 737
835 828 845 810 817
904 915 933 882 899
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sate investors for the loss of the investment tax credit and for the loss of
highly accelerated depreciation allowances. Treasury I depresses capital
formation at first, but during the last half of the simulation this proposal
produces the most rapid growth of the capital stock, once the gradual
introduction of its substantial dividend deduction is complete.. Although
the schedules of depreciation allowances in this first Treasury plan are
not as accelerated as the schedules of allowances in Treasury II, the
substantial dividend deduction in the first Treasury plan eventually
yields the greatest cash flow. Kemp-Kasten supports a greater rate of
capital formation than Bradley-Gephardt, but neither can support as
much investment spending as the two Treasury plans.
Table 5 helps illustrate how each of the tax reform proposals would
have affected cash flow in selected years. All the simulations in this table
fix the path of investment spending to match that of the ACRS simula-
tions with 5 percent inflation (tables 3 and 4). Under these circum-
stances, the Bradley-Gephardt proposal’s comparatively large reduction
of corporate income tax rates would increase cash flow about 5 percent
in 1985 and 8.5 percent by the year 2000. The reduction of tax rates in the
two Treasury plans and the Kemp-Kasten proposal are not as great; they
would increase cash flow only 7 percent and 6 percent, respectively, by
2000.12
Because the Bradley-Gephardt plan’s depreciation allowances are
not accelerated as much as the ACRS allowances, that proposal would
reduce cash flow about 4 percent in 1985 and 2.4 percent by 2000 as a
result of the change in depreciation rules. While the depreciation sched-
ules of the second Treasury proposal and the Kemp-Kasten proposal are
not accelerated as much as ACRS, they are more accelerated than the
Bradley-Gephardt allowances, and they are indexed for inflation. Conse-
quently the depreciation allowances for Treasu~3~ II and the Kemp-
Kasten proposal are sufficiently generous to add more than 5 percent to
cash flow by 2000. Even though the depreciation allowances for the first
Treasury proposal are indexed, by 2000 they would reduce cash flow
almost 4 percent, because the depreciation schedules for Treasury I are
not nearly as accelerated as those for the other tax reform proposals.
The first Treasury proposal eventually increases cash flow more
than 13 percent as a result of its substantial dividend deduction. The less
generous dividend deductions of Treasury II add less than 3 percent to
12From 1985 to 1990 pretax profits grow only 8 percent annually, while depreciation
allowances grow 11.5 percent, due to the rapid accumulation of highly accelerated depreci-
ation allowances in the ACRS simulation. As a result, taxable profits decline over these 5
years, making the reduction in corporate tax rates less valuable in 1990 than in 1985. After
1990, depreciation allowances rise more slowly than pretax profits, thereby increasing the
value of the reduction in tax rates.Table 5
The Effect of Tax Reform on Cash Flow
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cash flow. Finally, all proposals reduce cash flow 6 or 7 percent by repeal-
ing the investment tax credit.
Altogether the first Treasury proposal would boost cash flow by
more than 9 percent by the year 2000. The second Treasury proposal
would add almost 8 percent to cash flow. Although Treasury I eventually
overtakes Treasury II, for the first 15 years of the simulation Treasury II
contributes the most to cash flow. Kemp-Kasten does not contribute as
much as the two Treasury plans to corporate cash flow during this 20-
year simulation, but after a slow start it gains steadily on Treasury II.
Bradley-Gephardt also reduces cash flow substantially during the first
five years of the simulation, but, unlike Kemp-Kasten, the Bradley-Gep-
hardt proposal loses ground relative to the two Treasury plans during
the full 20-year simulation.
Treasury I offers the least accelerated depreciation allowances. For
this reason, this proposal supports the smallest rate of capital formation
for the first five years of all simulations (tables 3 and 4). With 3 percent
inflation, Bradley-Gephardt and Kemp-Kasten support nearly identical
rates of investment spending for the first 10 years of the simulation, but
neither fosters as much capital accumulation as ACRS or Treasury II.
During the second half of the simulation with 3 percent inflation, Trea-
sury II’s capital stock surpasses that of ACRS; Treasury I’s capital stock is
rapidly catching up with that of Treasury II; and Kemp-Kasten’s capital
stock, having surpassed that of Bradley-Gephardt, is also rapidly gain-
ing ground on ACRS as it catches up somewhat with Treasury II’s capital
stock.
Unlike ACRS and Bradley-Gephardt, the two Treasury proposals
and the Kemp-Kasten plan index their depreciation allowances so that
rising prices do not erode the purchasing power of these allowances. As
a result, rising inflation reduces the capital stock in the year 2000 most
for ACRS and Bradley-Gephardt. With 7 percent inflation, for instance,
the two Treasury plans and Kemp-Kasten foster more capital formation
by the year 2000 than does ACRS. Despite indexing, higher rates of
inflation depress the capital stock somewhat for the Treasury plans and
Kemp-Kasten as well, because depreciation allowances on investments
made before 1981 are not indexed for these plans. In the long run, the
rate of capital formation essentially would be unaffected by the inflation
rate under the Treasury plans and Kemp-Kasten, so these simulations
understate the advantages of these plans should inflation increase in the
future. On the other hand, for rates of inflation much below 3 percent,
the value of indexing becomes negligible, so ACRS and the Bradley-
Gephardt plan would become relatively more attractive.124 Richard W. Kopcke
The Neoclassical Results
Here the Kemp-Kasten proposal and the two Treasury proposals
produce the most rapid growth of the stock of producers’ durable equip-
ment and nonresidential structures (tables 6 and 7). Because the present
value of Kemp-Kasten’s depreciation allowances, by design, is very
nearly equal to the purchase price of capital goods, this plan fosters the
most investment spending throughout the 20-year simulation. Whereas
the stocks of equipment and structures grow at essentially equal rates
under the Treasuly’s first plan, Kemp-Kasten and Treasury II favor in-
vestment in structures.
In the cash flow simulation, the postponement of depreciation
allowances initially tended to reduce cash flow and investment spending
commensurately, but in the neoclassical model investors realize that
postponed allowances eventually will be claimed--albeit the waiting re-
duces their value somewhat. Consequently, in the neoclassical simula-
tion, the Kemp-Kasten plan and two Treasury plans support more
capital formation than does ACRS throughout the 20-year period, be-
cause investors foresee the value of future depreciation allowances and
the dividend deductions on the earnings of investments undertaken
from the very beginning. With 3 percent inflation, the capital stocks of
Kemp-Kasten and Treasury I surpass that of ACRS; Treasury II fosters
nearly as much investment spending as ACRS; and Bradley-Gephardt
supports the least capital formation.
Going behind these overall rankings, three of these four tax propos-
als tend to alter the composition of the capital stock. For example, com-
pared to Treasury I or the existing ACRS investment incentives, Kemp-
Kasten, Bradley-Gephardt, and Treasury II reduce the cost of capital
proportionately more for structures than for equipment.
According to the neoclassical model, investors consider the value of
depreciation allowances on new investments, not past investments,
when ordering new capital goods. Consequently, the growth of the cap-
ital stock under Kemp-Kasten and the two Treasury plans is not affected
by the rate of inflation, because these plans offer indexed depreciation
allowances on new investments. Rising inflation reduces the rate of cap-
ital formation for ACRS and the Bradley-Gephardt plan, which lack in-
dexed depreciation allowances. While ACRS may rival Treasury II for
fostering investment at low rates of inflation, at 7 percent inflation the
two Treasury plans and the Kemp-Kasten plan offer investment incen-
tives that surpass those of ACRS by a wide margin. At 3 percent inflation
ACRS encourages significantly more investment spending than Bradley-
Gephardt. At 7 percent inflation the gap between the capital stocks of
ACRS and Bradley-Gephardt is much smaller. Even though neither plan
indexes depreciation allowances, because of BradleyJGephardt’s rela-Table 6
The Stock of Producers’ DurabLe Equipment--Neoclassical Model
Billions of 1972 Dollars
ACRS Treasury I Treasury II Bradley-Gephardt Kemp-Kasten
3 Percent Inflation after 1984
1980 615 615 615 615 615
1985 713 728 718 693 721
1990 839 881 837 776 849
1995 969 1033 957 869 975
2000 1118 1203 1098 985 1123
Average Annual
Growth Rate (Percent) 3.0 3.4 2.9 2.4 3.1
5 Percent Inflation after 1984
1980 615 615 615 615 615
1985 713 728 718 692 721
1990 826 881 837 771 849
1995 941 1033 957 858 976
2000 1078 1203 1098 969 1123
Average Annual
Growth Rate (Percent) 2.8 3.4 2.9 2.3 3.1








Note: See appendix for details.
615 615 615 615 615
713 728 718 692 721
815 881 837 767 849
918 1033 957 849 976
1044 1203 1098 956 1123
2.7 3.4 2.9 2.2 3.1
>
>Table 7
The Stock of Nonresidential Structures--Neoclassical Model
Billions of 1972 Dollars
ACRS Treasury I Treasury II Bradley-Gephardt Kemp-Kasten
3 Percent Inflation after 1984
1980 611 611 611 611 611
1985 673 708 705 677 749
1990 777 860 841 786 949
1995 900 1029 994 912 1168
2000 1041 1220 1168 1057 1411
Average Annual
Growth Rate (Percent) 2.7 3.5 3.3 2.8 4.3
5 Percent Inflation after 1984
1980 6!1 611 611 611 611
1985 672 708 705 677 749
1990 765 860 841 779 949
1995 873 1029 994 897 1168
2000 1001 1220 1168 1035 1411
Average Annual
Growth Rate (Percent) 2,5 3.5 3.3 2.7 4.3
7 Percent Inflation after 1984
1980 611 611 611 611 611
1985 671 708 705 767 749
1990 755 860 841 773 949
1995 855 1029 994 887 1168
2000 973 1220 1168 1019 1411
Average Annual
Growth Rate (Percent) 2.4 3.5 3.3 2.6 4,3
Note: See appendix for details,TAX REFORM AND CAPITAL FORMATION 127
tively low corporate tax rate, the declining value of depreciation allow-
ances does not reduce cash flow for the Bradley-Gephardt plan as much
as it does for ACRS.
The Loss of Tax Revenue
In the cash flow simulations, investment spending is tied directly to
the concurrent cash flow of businesses. The plan that reduces business
tax liabilities the most also produces the most investment spending,
because the tax payment is the only element of cash flow that varies
among the simulations. Therefore, the Treasury proposals foster the
most rapid capital accumulation by reducing business tax payments by
the greatest amount.
According to the cash-flow model, the difference in capital spend-
ing between two plans is essentially proportional to the difference be-
tween the concurrent tax burdens they place on businesses. Conse-
quently, no tax proposal can be more "efficient" than another in the
sense that the difference in capital spending between plans divided by
their difference in concurrent government tax revenues is essentially a
constant, 1.14.
Had these cash flow simulations allowed overall economic activity
to vary directly with investment spending, the tax plans that produce
the most investment also would tend to increase income tax revenues,
because they would raise GNP and taxable incomes the most. Under
these circumstances, the increase in capital spending divided by the net
loss in government tax revenues could be greatest for the Treasury
plans, which foster the greatest rate of capital formation. This is 0nly a
conjecture, however. The response of GNP to business tax reductions
also depends on any changes in personal taxes. A greater business tax
cut may be accompanied by higher personal tax rates, which could re-
duce consumption spending and business revenues, thereby depressing
GNP growth or business cash flow. In assuming a constant 3 percent
growth of real GNP for all simulations, this study has not considered
some of the potential effects of revising personal taxes on capital forma-
tion.
Iia the neoclassical simulations, investment spending depends on
the concurrent and future return on investment. Consequently, a plan
that promises valuable tax reductions in the future may foster invest-
ment spending today with apparently little loss of tax revenue today. In
the long run, however, these promised tax reductions may be very cost-
ly if they do not produce sufficient capital formation today.
Adhering to the specific concept of efficiency described above--
which tax incentives deliver the greatest "bang" in capital spending per
"buck" of prospective revenue loss--reducing the corporate income tax128 Richard W. Kopcke
rate is the least efficient investment incentive. While encouraging new
investments, lower corporate tax rates reduce the tax liability on income
earned by existing capital as well. Accelerated depreciation and invest-
ment tax credits, on the other hand, can be limited to new investment
projects.13 Because the first Treasury proposal and the Bradley-Gephardt
plan rely relatively heavily on reducing the tax rate on corporate profits,
the neoclassical approach suggests that the Kemp-Kasten plan and the
second Treasury proposal provide more "efficient" tax incentives for in-
vestment.
Although this view is common, it does bear one considerable flaw.
The double taxation of corporate profits discourages business capital
formation. To ameliorate this deterrent, investment tax credits and accel-
erated or indexed depreciation allowances may be designed to offset the
burden of corporate income taxes, but this strategy may prepare the way
for substantial biases in the tax code. For instance, the value of depreci-
ation allowances to any investor may vary with economic conditions. As
a result, these allowances must be adjusted continually to prevent
changes in the expected level or pattern of inflation, changes in the term
structure of discount rates, changes in the relative prices of goods or
factors of production, and other variables from altering the relative tax
treatment of various capital goods or various industries. The changing
economic conditions of the past three decades have warranted many
such adjustments, including the enthusiastic promotion of ACRS in 1981
followed by the earnest appeal for tax reform by many former support-
ers of ACRS. Accordingly, the Treasury I plan’s blend of dividend deduc-
tions and indexed depreciation may be a most attractive and practical
approach to tax reform.
The Consequences of Tax Reform for Specific Industries
The foregoing results suggest that none of the four proposals for tax
reform, if adopted, would treat all businesses the same. After all, these
proposals were designed to rectify the current law’s inequitable treat-
ment of taxpayers, including businesses. Some proposals, for example,
tend to reduce the tax liabilities of firms purchasing structures. These
plans, therefore, would tend to boost the after-tax returns for firms in
the structure-intensive printing industry relative to the equipment-
intensive paper industry. Furthermore, because all four proposals would
13See also R. Kopcke, "The Efficiency of Traditional Investment Tax Incentives," in
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Public Policy and Capital Formation, April
1981, pp. 163-75.TAX REFORM AND CAPITAL FORMATION 129
reduce corporate income tax rates, they would tend to reduce the tax
burden most for industries with high ratios of profits to cash flow.
This study also examines how the various reform proposals would
tend to alter the cash flow and user cost of capital for selected industries.
The composition of the capital stock is assumed to remain constant for
each industry, matching that of the late 1970s for the duration of the
simulations. In the cash flow analyses, the rate of real investment for
each industry, by assumption, increases its stocks of equipment and
structures 3 percent per year. In this manner, the changes in cash flow
that accompany each tax reform isolate the direct effect of these reforms
on each industry. Inflation is set at 5 percent, so pretax earnings, divi-
dends, and all other components of cash flow except for depreciation
allowances and the tax liability grow approximately 8 percent per year.
The industrial simulations, like the aggregate simulations, show
that Treasury I reduces the cash flow of most businesses during its first
five years while its dividend deductions and tax rate costs are introduced
gradually. Treasury I eventually tends to reduce the tax burden most for
industries that use more structures than equipment in production and
for industries that pay substantial dividends. Accordingly, this proposal
would tend to increase the cash flow of manufacturing firms the most.
However, textile firms and manufacturers of paper, rubber, or primary
metals, which depend heavily on equipment or pay low dividends,
would experience lower cash flow. Similarly agricultural, mining, trans-
portation, and utility firms would have lower cash flow.
Treasury I and Treasury II tend to have similar effects on the pattern
of cash flow among the industries. Although Treasury II offers a much
smaller dividend deduction than Treasury I, Treasury II compensates by
accelerating depreciation allowances, especially those for structures.
Like the Treasury proposals, the Bradley-Gephardt proposal would
boost the cash flow of most manufacturing industries, while depressing
the cash flow in agriculture, mining, transportation, and utilities. But
Bradley-Gephardt does not reduce the tax burden for most manufactur-
ers as much as the Treasury plans. Similarly, Bradley-Gephardt does not
increase the tax burden as much on other industries.
The Kemp-Kasten proposal compared to current law and the other
plans greatly increases the value of depreciation allowances for struc-
tures. As a result; this proposal would boost the relative cash flow of
manufacturing firms considerably. In time, all manufacturing industries
would have greater cash flows under Kemp-Kasten. But, for other in-
dustries, Kemp-Kasten would increase tax liabilities when compared ei-
ther to current law or to the other reform proposals.
In many respects the results of the user cost simulations are similar
to those for the cash flow simulations. Manufacturing industries gener-
ally benefit from a greater reduction in user costs than other industries.130 Richard W. Kopcke
The Kemp-Kasten plan tends to reduce the relative cost of capital for
manufacturers the most; the Bradley-Gephardt plan reduces their rela-
tive user cost the least. While the two Treasury proposals seem to in-
crease investment incentives more for manufacturers than other
industries, these two plans appear to reduce the cost of capital more
uniformly across industries than Kemp-Kasten. The Treasury plans do
not appear to change the cost of capital for the various industries as
uniformly as Kemp-Kasten. Here, as in the macro simulations, all tax
reform proposals, except Kemp-Kasten, would reduce user costs for al-
most all industries. The Kemp-Kasten plan generally reduces the cost of
capital the most, providing slightly greater incentives for investment
than Treasury I.
Assuming that the appeals for tax reform do not arise from a lasting
shift in fiscal policy designed to encourage investment in manufactur-
ing, then adoption of any of these proposals may require other fiscal
measures in order to maintain our industrial balance. It is not clear, in
this case, that the resulting "distortions" in fiscal policy would be any
less onerous than those present in current policy. If the fostering of
investment in manufacturing is a welcome by-product of tax reform,
then this reform might not endure if, for example, future economic con-
ditions fostered a further expansion of manufacturing at the expense of
other industries. Since their inception, governments intentionally have
altered the composition of GNP, the allocation of resources, and the
distribution of income in order to achieve best their community’s goals.
No doubt future tax reforms, like those past, will continue to heed the
overall aims of policymakers as they manage fiscal policy. Consequently
the tax reforms eventually enacted probably will not clash to a great
degree with legislators’ attitudes about a proper federal industrial policy.
In this regard, the four proposals for tax reforms examined here do offer
lawmakers some distinct choices.
Conclusion
The Reagan administration enthusiastically promoted the tax re-
forms enacted in 1981. But by 1984, the Administration strongly empha-
sized the need for overhauling much of the revenue code, while
criticizing ACRS, introduced in 1981, for creating distortions and for
failing to provide consistent investment incentives when economic con-
ditions were changing. This is not an isolated event. Virtually all post-
war administrations changed their opinions about proper or acceptable
tax rules while they were in office.
If history is to offer us any instruction about tax reform, its foremost
lesson is that our conception of right and proper taxation generallyTAX REFORM AND CAPITAL FORMATION 131
changes as our knowledge, our economy, and our social goals evolve.
Consequently, those who have sold past tax reforms as enduring policy
changes and those who point to past "failures" in order to criticize cur-
rent tax reform efforts may be guilty of misplaced emphasis. Tax reforms
are best regarded as steps toward a destination that changes with experi-
ence.
This paper examines some of the consequences of four contempo-
rary proposals for tax reform--two Treasury plans, the Bradley-Gep-
hardt proposal and the Kemp-Kasten plan--assessing how they might
influence the rate of capital formation by altering the taxation of invest-
ment income. The results suggest that the two Treasury proposals and
Kemp-Kasten eventually would tend to increase the rate of capital for-
mation compared to ACRS. Even though these three proposals for tax
reform would repeal the investment tax credit and replace ACRS with
less accelerated dePreciation rules, they would boost investment by re-
ducing corporate income tax rates, by indexing depreciation allowances,
or by introducing a corporate dividend deduction. The first Treasury tax
reform proposal of late 1984 might depress investment spending at first,
but it eventually would tend to foster one of the most rapid rates of
capital formation by taking a long step toward eliminating the double
taxation of corporate profits.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the first Treasury proposal is
its attempt to move closer to taxing only the economic income of house-
holds and businesses. Rising inflation during the 1960s and 1970s erod-
ed the value of depreciation allowances, raising the tax burden on
investors. A series of tax reforms culminating in the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, designed to offset the effects of high rates of inflation,
now appears to have made tax incentives for investment too generous
during the early years of an asset’s life. The first Treasury proposal at-
tempts to link depreciation allowances to the economic rate of decay of
durable assets, and it indexes these allowances for inflation. In this man-
ner, the plan tries to achieve a more equitable measure of income that is
not distorted by changes in the inflation rate.
The plan also could reduce the cost of capital for businesses by
measuring the economic income of stockholders more accurately. Under
current law, the effective tax rate on real capital gains varies greatly with
the inflation rate. For example, during the high inflation of the 1970s
effective tax rates on real capital gains frequently exceeded 100 percent.
With the first Treasury plan, the effective tax rate on real capital gains
would not change with the rate of inflation. Consequently the Treasury’s
proposal might make stocks more attractive investments. During the
1970s, many investors shunned the stock market once they realized that
stocks were a poor inflation hedge, partly because the effective tax rate
on corporate income and equity investments rose with the rate of infla-132 Richard W. Kopcke
tion. The Treasury’s tax proposal might restore some of equity’s appeal
by indexing depreciation allowances, business inventory profits, and
capital gains income: the effective tax rate of the returns to stockholders
would no longer rise with the rate of inflation. 14
Whether or not they are enacted, each of the four proposals can
serve as models for designing future tax reforms. As such a statement of
"first principles," the first Treasury proposal seems to be a useful founda-
tion upon which to build. This is not to say that this Treasury plan
embodies the essence of fair and neutral taxation. In a sense, no tax can
be entirely neutral, and fairness is in the eye of the beholder. Future
recessions or rising relative prices of capital goods once again may war-
rant lawmakers’ studying special tax incentives for investment. A model
tax plan is like an engineer’s design for an efficient automobile or hotel.
We may not adopt the design because we want fancy fenders or airy
atriums. But the engineer’s plan allows us to assess the costs and bene-
fits of the features we might want, and the engineer’s plan allows us to
assess whether or not these features threaten the structural integrity of
the finished product. A model tax code deserves study and understand-
ing so that, at least conceptually, lawmakers can return to it in designing
each new tax reform. In this manner, a model code may minimize the
risk of the tax laws becoming a heap of complex, incompatible provi-
sions, which demand annual reforms while confounding the under-
standing of lawmakers and taxpayers alike.
~4See R. Kopcke, "The Continuing Decline in Corporate Profitability and Stock
Prices," New England Economic Review, July/August 1982; "Stocks Are Not an Inflation
Hedge," in J. A. Boeckh and R.T. Coghlan, eds., The Stock Market and Inflation (Dow~Jones
Irwin, 1982); and "The Decline in Corporate Profitability," New England Economic Review,
May/June 1978.
See also D. Fullerton "The Indexation of Interest, Depreciation, and Capital Gains: A
Model of Investment Incentives," National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper
No. 1655, June 1985; and J. Tatom, "Federal Income Tax Reform in 1985: Indexation,"
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, February 1985, pp. 5-12.TAX REFORM AND CAPITAL FORMATION 133
Appendix
The Cash Flow Model
5 IEt = 2.12 + ~i=o bi (CFt-i/PEt-i) + 3.13(.936)t
b0 = .370 b3 = .090 bt = .168 b4 = .082
b2 = .096 b5 = .006
KEt = IEt/4 + .957 KEt_1
ISt = 12.71 + ~]=0bi (CFt_t/PSt_i) + 1.85(.956)t
b0 = .084 ba = .047 bI = .076 b4 = .033
b2 = .062 bs = .025
KSt = ISt/4 + .984KSt_l
where
IE, IS: quarterly investment in producers’ durable equipment and nonresidential struc-
tures expressed in 1972 dollars;
KE, KS: stock of equipment and structures expressed in 1972 dollars;
PE, PS: price deflators for equipment and structures from National Income and Product
Accounts;
CF: nonfinancial corporate business cash flow, retained earnings plus depreciation
allowances, expressed at an annual rate;
t: a time index denoting the quarters; t equals unity in 1981:I.
The final term in both equations represents the prediction error of 1980:IV multiplied by
the autocorrelation coefficient raised to the power t.
The entries in text tables 3 and 4 are the values of the KE and KS for the fourth
quarters of the years shown. From 1981:I to 1984:IV, all simulations use historical values
for CF, PE, and PS. Afterward, PE and PS grow at the assumed rate of inflation.
For the ACRS ~simulations, pretax profit grows at an annual rate equal to unity less the
product of unity plus the inflation rate and unity plus .03 (the assumed rate of real
growth). Dividends increase at this same rate. To accomplish a smooth transition from
1984 to 1985 and subsequent years, depreciation allowances after 1984 equal the sum of
three comp, onents: $280 billion (book depreciation for nonfinancial corporations in 1984)
(year 1984) times (.92)    -    ; the ACRS allowances on subsequent investments undertaken after
1984; and a constant, $23 billion. The corporate tax rate equals .46 plus .54 times the
average state corporate profits tax rate. Taxes equal the tax rate (as defined in the previous
sentence) times the difference between pretax profits and depreciation allowances less the
amount of the investment tax credit (.096 times PE°IE). CF then equals pretax profits less
dividends less taxes plus depreciation allowances. Starting in 1985:I the calculated value of
the investment tax credit was reduced by $6 billion in every quarter and the simulated
value of CF was raised by $30 billion in eve~3z quarter to allow for a smooth transition. This
lump-sum approach (rather than a lower effective tax credit and tax rate approach) seemed
appropriate, because with continuing growth more corporate income would be taxed at
the maximum prevailing marginal rate and "carry-forwards" or "carry-backs" would di-
minish in significance.134 Richard W. Kopcke
For simulations other than ACRS, CF equals CF as determined above less the change
in taxes. The change in taxes equals the new maximum corporate tax rate times the change
in depreciation allowances (ACRS allowances on investments made after 1980:IV less the
appropriate tax plan’s allowances on its simulated investments), plus the investment tax
credits from the ACRS simulation, plus the change in the maximum corporate tax rate (the
new maximum rate less the tax rate as defined in the previous paragraph) times taxable
profits from the ACRS simulation, less the new maximum tax rate times the dividend de-
duction. The new maximum tax rate equals the proposed federal rate plus the product of
the state tax rate and one minus the proposed federal rate.
For tax plans that allow businesses to invest more of their pretax cash flow (due to
lower tax liabilities), no allowance is made for the more rapid growth of pretax profit in the
future as a result of this greater rate of capital accumulation. This conservative assumption
tends to understate the differences among the various tax plans, but it does not alter their
basic ranking. (The neoclassical simulations "forecast" more rapid capital formation than
the cash flow models partly because they recognize the return on investment that accom-
panies this capital deepening.) Because total fixed investment eventually rises $1.14 for
every $1 of sustained tax cut, debt and interest expense must be rising faster in the simula-
tions that foster more investment with greater tax cuts. The simulations conservatively
assume that the increased profit on the additional investment that is financed by debt
equals the service charges imposed by this additional debt.
The simulations of Treasury II do not include the "recapture" provisions that do not
allow businesses to benefit both from ACRS depreciation schedules on investment under-
taken from 1981 to 1985 and from the lower corporate income tax rates to be enacted after
1985. By starting all simulations in 1981, the recapture provisions are not necessary in this
study. Should Treasury II, with recapture, be enacted in the future, the growth of the
capital stock could be less than that of the Kemp-Kasten plan until the effects of the
recapture have lapsed.
Implicit in these simulations is the assumption that the after-tax nominal rate of inter-
est (hence the real rate of interest) is the same for all simulations. This same assumption
applies to the neoclassica! simulations. We adopt this assumption mostly because it is
convenient (mostly, but not entirely--see footnote 10). Any reasonable alternative would
require a complete model of the effect of tax reform on household saving and credit mar-
kets as well as on investment demand. As stated in the text, this undertaking is beyond
the scope of this paper.
For text table 5, the various simulations as described above are repeated, except that
inflation is fixed at 5 percent and the amount of investment spending in the simulations
for the two Treasury proposals, the Bradley-Gephardt proposal, and the Kemp-Kasten
proposal is constrained to equal that of the ACRS simulation.TAX REFORM AND CAPITAL FORMATION 135
The Neoclassical Model
IEt =~I~=o bi (Qt-i/REt-,-i) - ~13=1ci (Qt-i/REt-i) + .089 KEt_1 + 14.01(.942)t
bo = .021 b7 = .042 b1 = .030 bs = .038
b2 = .034 b9 = .033 b3 = .042 blo = .028
b4= .045 bn = .021
b~ = .045 b~2 = .014
b6 = .044
C1 = .020 ca = .042
c2 ~ .030 c9 = .038
c3 = .037 Cio = .033
ca = .042 c~ = .026
cs = .045 c12 = .019
c6 = .046 c~3 = .012
c7 = .044
KEt = IEt/4 + .957 KEt_~
10 ISt = ~i=~bi (Qt_i/RSt_i) + .0278 KSt_~ + (,967)t
b1 = .0013 b6 = .0002
bz = .0011 b7 = .0001
b3 = .0009 b8 = .0002
b~ = .0006 b9 = .0004
b5 = .0004 b~0 = .0007
KSt = ISt/4 + .984 KSt_~
where
Q: business product expressed in 1972 dollars at an annual rate
RE, RS: User cost of equipment and structures, where
RE = (PE/P) (.15 + D) (1 - ITC - TAX (WE) - .3 (1 - DEBT))/(1 - TAX)
RS = (PS/P) (.05 + D) (1 - TAX (WS) - .3 (1 - DEBT))/(1 - TAX)
PE, PS are the implicit price deflators for producers’ durable equipment and nonresiden-
tial structures, respectively. (U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis)
P is the implidt price deflator for GNP. (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis)
The economic rate of depreciation for equipment is estimated at .15 and structures .05.
D, the discount rate for corporate profits after corporate income taxes, equals the Standard
& Poor’s dividend/price ratio for common stocks plus an estimate of the real rate of growth
of nonfinancial corporate enterprises, a constant 4 percent. This definition of D is inspired
by the Gordon growth model for valuing equities. See for example T. Campbell, Financial
Institutions, Markets, and Economic Activity (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982), esp. pp. 55-58.
ITC is the investment tax credit on equipment. Although many public utility structures are
eligible for investment tax credits, we assume the effective tax credit for all corporate136 Richard W. Kopcke
structures is zero. As long as utility regulatory commissions enforce target rates of return,
a higher tax credit may reduce revenues for utilities, rather than reducing the user cost of
capital.
WE is the present value of depreciation allowances for equipment using the most "acceler-
ated" formulas permitted by law. The discount rate used is .02 plus -~. WS is defined
similarly for structures..02 represents the assumed real rate of return on bonds after taxes,
a figure roughly consistent with the inflation forecasts given below assuming a tax rate of
40 percent.
"~ is the average inflation rate expected to prevail over the holding period of new bonds
issued in each quarter. The values used in this series are as follows:
1976:I to 1977:IV 5.5% 1982:111 7.0%
1978:I to 1978:IV 6.0% 1982:IV to 1983:IV 5.5%
1979:I to 1979:IV 7.0% 1984:I to 1984:II 6.0%
1980:I to 1980:IV 8.0% 1984:III to 1984:IV 5.5%
1981:I to 1982:II Z5%
DEBT is the present value of debt service charges after taxes per dollar borrowed at the
prevailing Aa new utility rate. The maturity of the loan equals the tax lifetime of the
capital good. The discount rate is the same as that for WE.
According to the neoclassical model, in deciding whether to undertake an investment
project, business managers compare the present value of the project’s cash flow with its
cost. A firm will then accept investments until the cost of the last project accepted equals
its discounted cash flow. Supposing the equity to capital ratio is .7 and the present value
of real economic returns before taxes is V (real returns depreciate 15 percent per year and
the discount rate is D):
PE(.7) = P(1 - TAX)V + PE [-.3 DEBT + TAX (WE) + ITC]
or PE = P(1 - TAX)V + PE [.3(1 - DEBT) + TAX (WE) + ITC]
This equation yields the user cost of capital RE. (See for example R. E. Hall and D. W.
Jorgenson, "Tax Policy and Investment Behavior," American Economic Review, June 1967,
pp. 391-414.) The expected rate of change of PE[P is assumed to be negligible.
The final term in both equations represents the prediction error of 1980:IV multiplied by
the autocorrelation coefficient raised to the power t.
For text tables 6 and 7, the entries equal the capital stock for the fourth quarter of each
year shown. For all simulations Q grows 3 percent annually after 1984:IV, while all price
deflators grow at the rate of inflation. In all user costs, the dividend/price ratio on common
stocks and the real cost of debt finance are assumed to equal their values of 1984:IV in all
subsequent quarters. Consequently, the present value of depreciation allowances, the cor-
porate tax rate, and the amount of the investment tax credit are the only variables that
distinguish the various tax plans from one another. ACRS alone features an investment
tax credit of .096 in RE. For the two Treasury plans and the Bradley-Gephardt plan, the real
depreciation allowances are discounted at a real rate of 2 percent. (We also calculated user
costs with a 4 percent discount rate. See the tables below.) For ACRS and the Kemp-
Kasten plan, depreciation allowances are discounted at the inflation rate plus 2 percent.
Because the two Treasury plans allow a dividend deduction, which effectively reduces the
marginal tax rate on taxable profits, the corporate tax rate in the denominator of their user
cost formulas is reduced by assuming that one-half of taxable profits are distributed as
dividends. (Since a dollar of depreciation allowances always can reduce taxable profits by
one dollar, regardless of dividends, the present value of depreciation allowances in the
two Treasury plans is multiplied by their respective maximal corporate tax rates.) DuringTAX REFORM AND CAPITAL FORMATION 137
the period when the dividend deduction is being introduced in steps, the rate of the
effective dividend deduction equals a discounted value of present and future effective
rates of dividend deductions.
The following tables show the user costs behind the neoclassical simulations. For the
purposes of the simulations, we assumed a 2 percent real discount rate, after taxes. The
tables also show user costs, assuming a 4 percent real discount rate. The switch to a 4
percent discount rate does not alter the relative ranking of the tax proposals’ user costs.
This switch would not alter the ranking of Kemp-Kasten’s user costs on equipment or
structures, each considered separately, but it would raise the overall user cost for the
Kemp-Kasten plan relative to that of Treasury I so that both of these plans would have the
same overall cost of capital. The Kemp-Kasten plan, therefore, would share top billing
with Treasury I if the neoclassical simulations were repeated using a 4 percent discount
rate.Table A1
The User Cost of Capital: Equipment
Percent
ACRSa Treasury I Treasury II Bradley-Gephardta Kemp-Kasten
2 Percent Real Discount Rate
1980b ,235 .235 ,235 .235 .235
!981 .222 .208 .203 .256 ,211
1982 .216 .200 ,211 ,253 .207
1983 .199 .180 .195 .225 .188
1984 .199 .178 .193 .225 .188
3% 5% 7% 3% 5% 7%
1985 .187 .196 .204 .173 .193 .217 .222 .226 .187
1986c ,187 .196 ,204 .172 .193 .217 .222 .226 .187
4 Percent Real Discount R~e
1980b ,245 .245 ,245 .245 ,245
1981 .230 .218 .2!2 ,261 .222
1982 .225 .209 .219 ,258 .218
1983 .206 .189 .200 .230 .199
1984 .207 .187 ,199 .230 ,198
3% 5% 7% 3% 5% 7%
1985 .196 .204 .212 .181 .199 .222 .226 .230 .197
1986c .196 .204 .212 .180 .199 .222 .226 .230 .197
aBecause depreciation allowances are not indexed for these plans, the user costs after 1984 depend on the assumed rate of inflation: 3, 5, or 7 percent.
bUser costs equal those prevailing before the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
CUser costs remain constant after 1985.Table A2
The User Cost of Capital: Structures
Percent
ACRSa Treasury I Treasury II Bradley-Gephardta Kemp-Kasten
2 Percent Rea! Discount Rate
1980b .270 .270 ,270 ,270 ,270
198! .250 ,194 .188 .240 .154
1982 .258 .197 .202 .250 .156
1983 .216 ,169 .175 .209 ,135
1984 .219 ,168 ,174 ,208 ,135
3% 5% 7% 3% 5% 7%
1985c .200     .214 ,225 .161 .174 .197 ,204 ,209 .133
4 Pe~ent Real Discount R~e
1980b .272 ,272 ,272 .272 .272
1981 .260 .214 .209 .245 .185
1982 .267 .217 ,22! ,255 .191
1983 .222 ,186 ,191 .214 .164
1984 .223 .184 ,190 .213 .163
3% 5% 7% 3% 5% 7%
1985c .214     .225 .234 .177 ,190 ,204 .209 .213 .161
aBecause depreciation allowances are not indexed for these plans, the user costs after 1984 depend on the assumed rate of inflation: 3,5, or 7 percent.
bUser costs equal those prevailing before the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.





Tax reform has once again reached prominence among national eco-
nomic issues. This is not surprising in view of the long-standing dissatis-
faction of a majority of Americans who believe that the current tax
system is unjustifiably complex and unfair. What is unusual this time
around is that the present tax-redesign effort does not pretend to ad-
dress the major economic problems of the day. It is not as though the
current problems of our economy are less significant than those of the
past: there is near consensus that the unprecedented deficits in our fed-
eral budget and our foreign trade are ominous. It is as though these
problems are so overwhelming that relief.is sought by diverting atten-
tion to what are thought to be the more manageable issues such as
fairness and simplicity.
Fairness and simplicity are worthy long-term objectives for tax poli-
cy, but only if their attainment does not impair economic growth and
employment. Mr. Kopcke implicitly addresses the question of economic
growth by analyzing the effects of four major tax proposals (Treasury I
and II, Bradley-Gephardt, and Kemp-Kasten) on the rate of capital for-
mation. In addition, he discusses issues relating to the neutrality of the
tax system, which affects growth by virtue of the efficiency of allocation
of capital across productive activities.
Concerning neutrality, he concludes that whereas no tax system can
be neutral in the strict sense of the word, some systems are more neutral
than others. He states also that "our conception of right and proper
taxation generally changes as our knowledge, our economy, and our
*Chairman of the Board and President of Thermo Electron Corporation, and member
of the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.DISCUSSION 141
social goals evolve." I fully agree. Concerning the rate of capital forma-
tion, he concludes that Treasury I and II and Kemp-Kasten eventually
would tend to increase the rate of capital formation compared to present
tax law. I disagree.
In my opinion all four tax-reform proposals examined will, for sev-
eral years, retard capital formation and accelerate the decline of our
international competitive position, not only in basic industries but high-
technology ones as well. There are benefits that can be attributed to each
of the four proposals in an ultimate equilibrium state, assuming the
share of our manufacturing industry does not change. However, if any
of those proposals are enacted in their present form, the damage inflict-
ed during the transition period is likely to overshadow such long-term
benefits.
There are two bases for my conclusion. One is analytical and the
other is common sense. Let me start first with the latter, which usually
turns out to be more dependable.
All four proposals increase overall business taxes substantially, at
least for a transition period of several years. Moreover, they reduce tax
rates on earnings from capital already in place--a windfall for past in-
vestors. The plans, therefore, must raise revenue by increasing taxes on
new capital, counter to traditional wisdom that tax rates on new capital
should be kept low to spur investment. Thus, U.S. manufacturers will
be further motivated to use cash generated by fixed assets in the United
States to finance investments abroad. In addition, liquidation of domes-
tic assets will be facilitated by the lowering of personal tax rates under all
plans and the dividend deductibility provisions of the two Treasury pro-
posals. Eventually, three of the four proposals will reduce business taxes
and improve capital-allocation efficiency, but the present value of such
benefits will probably be more than offset by the shorter-term damage.
Let us now disregard, as Kopcke has done, the transition problems
and discuss the analysis that has led to his conclusions concerning long-
term equilibrium. He uses two models: the cash-flow and the neoclassi-
cal. I have problems with both models.
First, I do not believe that corporate cash flow motivates or should
motivate investment. By and large, corporations make investments only
if the discounted present value of after-tax earnings from such invest-
ments is greater than the cost of the investments.
Many corporations reduce their rate of investment during reces-
sions, not because their cash flow is reduced, but because demand for
their products is low. For these companies investment and cash flow
seem to correlate simply because these two indicators are procyclical. It
would be very surprising if the correlation persisted in the absence of a
recession. Moreover, such a correlation does not apply to high-technol-
ogy companies that have relatively fewer fixed assets and more inven-142 George N. Hatsopoulos
tories and receivables. They enjoy increasing cash flow but invest less
during recessions. In any case, Kopcke does not seem to put much
weight on the cash-flow model since its results mostly contradict his
final conclusions.
The neoclassical model requires the evaluation of ~he user cost of
capital for each class of assets considered. Kopcke considers two classes
of assets--equipment and structures--but not inventories, receivables,
or land. I differ with him in his calculations of the cost of capital on
several points.
In the traditional calculation of the user cost of capital, first intro-
duced by Hall and Jorgenson, all cash flows from an investment, includ-
ing taxes and tax credits, are discounted by the marginal after-tax cost of
funds, which combines the cost of equity and the after-tax cost of debt in
some proportions. Kopcke departs from this approach. He discounts the
economic returns before taxes by the cost of equity and discounts all
other cash flows by a lower fixed real rate of return plus inflation. His
rationale is that the only cash-flow stream that is uncertain and, there-
fore, warrants the risk premium included in the cost of equity, is the
project’s economic return--after all, tax credits, depreciation allowances,
and interest payments on bonds involve no uncertainty.
I object to this procedure for two reasons. First, the risk premium
reflected in the cost of equity, which Kopcke uses to discount the risky
cash flows, is too low. The observed required return on equity reflects
the investor’s discount rate on all corporate cash flows, both risky and
riskless. The discount rate investors apply to the risky component alone
is, therefore, substantially greater than the cost of equity. Second, many
of the cash flows which are modeled as certain, for example depreciation
allowances, are in fact uncertain since many firms may pay no corporate
taxes in some future years.
To project interest rates post enactment, Kopcke assumes that the
after-tax rate of interest is the same for all simulations. This assumption
implies that the after-tax rate of return required by marginal bondhold-
ers is invariant. But Kopcke does not specify who these marginal bond-
holders are. Different results would be obtained depending on whether
these marginal bondholders are tax-exempt institutions, corporations, or
households. Moreover, he does not take into account the fact that the
proposed tax reforms will lower domestic savings, initially by shifting
taxes from consumers to business, and eventually by increasing the fed-
eral deficit. Simulations of all these effects have been performed by Data
Resources Inc.1 They conclude that nominal pretax interest rates will
1See Data Resources, Inc., "The DRI Study of Tax Reform" (a private multiclient
study), Lexington, MA: May 1985; Roger E. Brinner, Testimony to the Senate Finance
Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee, June 27, 1985; and Roger E.
Brinner, "Tax Reform II: The President’s Tax Proposals for Fairness, Growth, and Simplic-
ity," U.S. Long-Term Review, Summer 1985.DISCUSSION 143
change one way or the other and, as a result, the after-tax cost of corpo-
rate debt will increase.
For the real cost of equity D, Kopcke uses the expression
D = Y + G (1)
where Y is the dividend-to-price ratio for common stocks and G an esti-
mated real rate of growth of nonfinancial enterprises. While this expres-
sion, used widely in the literature, makes good sense, it is unreasonable
to assume that the yield Y and real rate of growth G will not change
significantly as a result of a major change in the tax code. Although it is
nearly impossible to make an accurate evaluation of the effects of the tax
code upon the cost of equity, there are several plausible models that I
have used which show such effects to be significant.
Kopcke reduces the corporate tax rate that appears in the denomina-
tor of his final formula for the cost of capital by a factor that depends on
the fractions of corporate dividends that are tax-deductible. Such a
modification is unjustifiable. Dividend deductibility does reduce the cost
of capital, but only by virtue of the fact that the cost of equity is less than
that indicated by equation (1). Specifically, if a fraction 13 of the divi-
dends paid by a corporation can be deducted from taxable income, the
after-tax cost of such dividends is reduced by the factor (1 - [~Z), where
Z is the statutory marginal corporate tax rate. In this case the appropriate
expression for the cost of equity is
D = Y(1 - ~Z) + G (2)
My own analysis of the effects of the four proposals on factors af-
fecting economic growth in the long term, disregarding short-term dam-
age, indicates the following:
1. The user cost of capital for equipment will rise by more than 10
percent.
2. The user cost of capital for structures will decline by more than 5
percent.
3. The tax code will be more neutral across different types of tangible
assets and, therefore, allocation of capital will be more efficient.
4. The real discount rate, after taxes, that businesses apply to future
cash flows will rise. That means that investment in new ventures
such as R&D activities will either decline, focus on shorter-term
payoffs, or both.
The first three effects may balance each other, but the fourth effect is so
critical to the international position of our manufacturing industries that
all four proposals, especially the Treasury I plan and Bradley-Gephardt,
will reduce economic growth in the United States.
In his closing remarks Kopcke points out that all proposals, and in
particular Treasury I, seem to be useful models upon which to build144 George N. Hatsopoulos
future tax reforms. There is no question in my mind that all of the
proposals examined contain ideas that are sound and useful. But a far
better model than any of these is the Japanese tax system, which com-
bines neutrality across assets, virtual elimination of double taxation,
strong incentives for growth, and strong disincentives to stagnation. It is
partly due to such a tax system that Japan’s cost of capital is less than
half that of the United States and its investment in equipment per em-
ployee and rate’ of productivity growth more than twice ours.2
2George N. Hatsopoulos and Stephen H. Brooks, "The Gap in the Cost of Capital:
Causes, Effects, and Remedies," in R. Landau and D.W. Jorgenson, Technology and Econom-
ic Policy (Ballinger: forthcoming 1986).Discussion
Alan J. Auerbach*
In looking at the order of discussants, I imagined that my role in
evaluating Richard Kopcke’s paper on investment was to steer a course
between the cost-of-capital Scylla and the Charybdis of the accelerator.
This is relatively easy when the mean squared error is as large as is
typically found in investment equations.
This is where I begin, and it will also be where I finish. Perhaps the
most important point to be emphasized, when considering fundamental
changes in our tax system, is that our econometric techniques provide us
with little ability to predict economic behavior when we introduce major
.changes in the economic conditions facing firms. It is prudent to attrib-
ute a fair amount of uncertainty to simulated responses to major tax
revisions. My specific comments on the paper are intended to illustrate
this point.
Kopcke simulates the effects of four popular tax reform plans on
fixed investment by firms, using two familiar models of investment be-
havior, the cash-flow model and the neoclassical model. According to
the cash-flow model, a firm’s investment is determined by the level of its
internally generated funds. According to the neoclassical model, the
investment decision rests on changes in the level of output and in the
user cost of capital, which in turn is based on financial costs, tax factors,
and the rate at which capital decays. The author is a bit misleading in
suggesting that "these two approaches explained the recent course of
investment spending rather well." What he really means is that they do
as well or better than other models. The fact is that investment in the
1980s has been rather hard to predict. This is evident if one looks at
*Professor of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania and Research Associate at
the National Bureau of Economic Research.146 Alan J. Auerbach
Kopcke’s earlier paper in which he actually estimated the equations he
uses here. Out-of-sample root-mean-squared errors for the 1980s are
many times larger than those for the sample period of estimation, and,
like those of most other forecasters, Kopcke’s models underpredict the
strength of recent investment.
The problem is that real, after-tax interest rates have been too high,
and after-tax corporate profitability too ~ow, to justify the investment
recovery observed in 1984. Some (for example, Bosworth 1985) have
suggested that what is happening is a strong shift in the demand for
capital among sectors. Because of the irreversibility of investment, weak
demand in one sector does not fully cancel strong demand elsewhere:
you can’t turn a tractor into a word processor. However, there are always
sectoral shifts over time, making this explanation for the unusual recent
behavior of investment less than compelling. Others (for example, Blan-
chard and Summers 1984) have suggested that investors have greater
confidence in government and expectations of future profitability than
they did a few years ago. Perhaps this reveals the true meaning of "voo-
doo economics" as the act of conjuring up the animal spirits first envis-
aged by Keynes.
Thus, Kopcke begins his analysis of proposed reforms with models
carrying very limited warranties. He then must decide just how to ac-
count for different provisions not present in the current tax code. Two of
the most important of these provisions are found in the two Treasury
proposals, Treasury I and Treasury II, the latter perhaps more appropri-
ately called White House I. These are the dividends-paid deduction, set
at 50 percent of dividends paid under Treasury I and 10 percent of divi-
dends paid under Treasury II, and the windfall tax on excess depreci-
ation that would be imposed under Treasury II.
Kopcke ignores the second, following the logic that his comparisons
begin in 1981, before any excess depreciation under ACRS would have
occurred. This has the effect of making cash flow under Treasury II look
a lot better to his investment model than it does to actual investors at the
moment, who would lose $56.5 billion between now and 1989 as a result
of this specific provision.
In accounting for the effect of the dividends-paid deduction on the
user cost of capital, he assumes that firms will pay out half of their gross
returns to capital, before depreciation, as dividends. This is a substantial
overstatement of actual payout ratios. If one takes the more usual ap-
proach of treating dividend relief as a reduction in the effective personal
tax rate on that fraction of after-tax earnings coming from new invest-
ment that is distributed as dividends, the implied changes in the cost of
capital are much smaller. My back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest
that Kopcke would predict percentage reductions in the user cost of
capital under the Treasury I dividends-paid deduction that would, forDISCUSSION 147
equipment, exceed that coming from a doubling of the investment tax
credit. My own calculations also suggest that he has overstated the effect
of these provisions by at least a factor of between three and six.
I say "at least" because Kopcke does not account at all for the view
held by at least some economists (discussed in Auerbach 1983b) that
dividend taxes impose an even smaller effect on the cost of capital than
would be indicated by looking at payout ratios. Hence, both plans, and
particularly Treasury I, will look much better to the neoclassical model
than is probably appropriate.
With these points in mind, it is interesting to consider the paper’s
predictions that the plan most effective in encouraging the accumulation
of business fixed capital would be Treasury II according to the cash-flow
model and Treasury I according to the neoclassical model. I suspect that
each of these results depends crucially on the way in which Kopcke has
interpreted these plans, and that if different, perhaps more realistic as-
sumptions were incorporated, Kopcke, like others, would find that it is
hard to beat ACRS for total fixed investment, except perhaps with
Kemp-Kasten, for which FAST is certainly an appropriate acronym in the
area of depreciation allowances.
Before concluding, I must raise a strong objection to Kopcke’s char-
acterization of tax neutrality in the beginning of his paper. We can all
agree that lump sum taxes are nondistortionary and that this is a compli-
cated world, but there is a well-supported efficiency argument for at-
tempting to make the tax base correspond to true economic income, if
indeed an income tax is to be used at all (Auerbach 1982). This amounts
to trying to make depreciation schedules resemble those dictated by
economic depreciation, or at least mimic the effect of such schedules
through other means. The efficiency cost of the present distortionary
system of corporate taxation is probably on the order of several billion
dollars a year (Auerbach 1983a). Nowadays such numbers seem small
but we need all the national income we can get. Moreover, there are
important additional problems associated with the rapid depreciation of
assets under current law, most notably the increased incidence of tax
losses and their associated distortions.
Certainly there are problems in making the transition to a less dis-
tortionary tax system. One must also worry about second-best consider-
ations, and the fact that going from a tax system with high tax rates and
investment incentives to one with low rates and low investment incen-
tives may waste tax revenue on substantial windfalls to existing capital
assets. But this does not make the goal of reduced distortions, which
plays an important role in all of the proposals considered here, unimpor-
tant or simply a matter of equity. Rather, it means that we have to think a
little harder about the design of appropriate transition schemes, such as
a phased reduction in corporate taxes (analyzed in Auerbach and Hines148 Alan J. Auerbach
1986) that can provide better short-run investment incentives while at
the same time increasing corporate tax collections.
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Robert Eisner*
The bottom line of Kopcke’s ambitious study is that three of the four
tax reform proposals he considers, Treasury I and Treasury II and Kemp-
Kasten, would boost business investment. I don’t believe it, but that’s
not all bad. Indeed, I might begin by challenging the fairly conventional
wisdom that we want more business investment. Business investment
does not necessarily promote growth. It can be unproductive.
The widespread notion that investment does promote growth
stems, presumably, from the notion that businesses in a free market
undertake investment in the (correct) expectation that its future pro-
ceeds exceed its current costs. But if those proceeds include tax subsi-
dies, firms may be induced to acquire capital assets whose future
product exclusive of tax benefits is less than their supply price or oppor-
tunity cost. That is the path of decline, not growth.
The notion that business investment under current law has been
retarded by its tax treatment is not easy to sustain. The combination of
deductibility of swollen nominal interest costs, exclusion of the bulk of
capital gains from taxation, accelerated depreciation for tax purposes,
the investment tax credit, the proliferation of tax shelters, and the exclu-
sion of vast amounts of saving from taxes, is such that the current tax
system on balance subsidizes new business fixed investment, albeit
most unevenly.
And I must also inveigh against the all too easy assumption that
business income taxes in general discourage business investment. The
fact is that the corporate profits tax is a tax on corporate income: income
from capital, from labor, or from any other factor of production. It does
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not in itself change relative factor costs and therefore does not encourage
less capital-intensive production. I suppose application of the "cash-
flow" model, with the assumption that corporate income taxes are in no
way passed on, can bring the then definitional result, in terms of that
model, that investment must fall. That is just another piece of evidence
on the foolishness of the cash-flow model of investment.
I might as well state it flatly: the cash-flow model is nonsense. If it
really described business behavior, our rationale for a private-profit mar-
ket system would be destroyed. Businesses would be investing whether
capital assets promised to be productive or profitable or not, merely
because they had the money.
Indeed, curiously, the "cash flow" in cash-flow models, including
Kopcke’s version, does not even measure cash flow. Rather it describes
gross profits minus dividend payout; and with dividends a fairly sticky
variable, variations in cash flow reflect variations in gross profits. But
profits need hardly be in cash and frequently are largely tied up in inven-
tories and accounts receivable.
Kopcke does not make clear in the current paper where he gets his
models’ presumably estimated parameters. The usual positive associ-
ations between cash flow and investment relate essentially to the fact
that both investment and profits are procyclical. That tells us nothing
about the likely effects of a structural change in after-tax profits brought
on by changes in tax provisions.
In Kopcke’s simulations with a cash-flow model, dividend deduct-
ibility, as in Treasury I, increases cash flow--and therefore investment--
because the only element of cash flow that Kopcke allows to be affected
by the various tax plans is the tax payments themselves. But surely,
offering 50 percent deductibility for dividend payments could be expect-
ed to encourage firms to pay out more of their earnings. If they more
than double their payout, cash flow, as defined, would actually decline!
I would quarrel with Kopcke’s assertion that double taxation of divi-
dends discourages capital formation. It does indeed distort capital fi-
nancing and it inhibits the free flow of potentially investable funds. To
the extent that it discourages payout, however, it may well encourage
firms to expand and one major way of expanding is investment. As to
the notion that the double taxation of dividends significantly raises the
cost of capital to the firm, this largely ignores the overwhelming role in
the supply of capital of the expectation of essentially untaxed capital
gains, as well as the extent to which investors with low or zero marginal
tax rates are likely to be preponderant among dividend recipients.
While the cash-flow model may, to put it bluntly, be reasonably
dismissed out of hand, the difficulties in the so-called neoclassical model
are in part intrinsic and in part related to Kopcke’s application of the
model. A major difficulty is the common one of assuming parameters,DISCUSSION 151
such as interest rates or costs of capital, which may appear exogenous to
the firm, as independent, in the economy as a whole, of variations in tax
parameters. The introduction of ACRS in 1981, according to some neo-
classical model devotees, was supposed to bring about a big increase in
business investment by reducing the rental price or user cost of capital.
In fact, the increase in the rental cost of capital due to a sharp rise in real
interest costs considerably outweighed reductions due to the more fa-
vorable tax treatment. But should not any reasonable macroeconomic
model have suggested that the tax reduction, particularly one deemed to
increase investment demand, would contribute to higher real interest
rates?
I have some concern for the particular distributed lag formulation,
going back to an article of Bischoff a number of years ago, from which
Kopcke derives his parameters. Perhaps more troublesome is the use of
dividend/price ratios as the variable element in the cost of capital. As I
confess I have tried to point out on a number of previous occasions, the
dividend/price ratio is much more properly viewed as the inverse of a
measure of the expected profitability of investment than of the cost of
capital. For the price of equity will be high relative to fairly sticky divi-
dend payments precisely when expected future profits on investment
are high. A negative time series relation between investment and a "cost
of capital" built around the dividend/price ratio tells us nothing about
any true relation with the cost of capital or the total rental price of capital
of which it is a part. For the cost of capital to a firm relates not to its
current dividends but to the share of expected earnings which must be
anticipated for new stockholders. We can infer nothing from the relation
between investment and the dividend/price ratio about the effects of
changes in tax parameters that would affect the rental price of capital.
A further problem with both estimation of the neoclassical invest-
ment function and its use to predict effects of changes in tax parameters
is the failure to include a price expectations or capital gains term. This
term was indeed in the original neoclassical formulations but, presum-
ably because of data difficulties, is rarely included in estimations. But it
can be critical.
In fact, the effect of corporate tax rate changes on the rental price of
capital is ambiguous in the neoclassical formulation. It is not necessarily
true that a higher corporate tax rate will increase the rental price of
capital or that a lower rate will reduce it. The business income tax rate
actually enters in both the numerator and the denominator of the rental
price of capital term. Changes in it depend upon an interaction with the
expected rate of capital gains, the present value of tax depreciation
allowances, the proportion of the cost of capital which is tax-deductible
--and that may be more than 100 percent when inflation swells nominal
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ment tax credit. Without specifying all of these, we cannot infer that
lowering the corporate tax rate, as all of the tax reform proposals would,
actually lowers the rental price or user cost of capital.
But a major factor in Kopcke’s results with the neoclassical model
relates, particularly for the evaluation of Treasury I, to his treatment of
dividend deductibility. For he sees in this a reduction in the marginal tax
rate which enters with a negative sign in the denominator, but no
change in the marginal tax rate applicable to the present value of depre-
ciation deductions in the numerator! This stacks the deck overwhelm-
ingly in favor of any plan with dividend deductions and makes Treasury
I, with its 50 percent dividend deduction, a huge "winner."
I see no justification for this treatment. Dividends, which are only
about one-third of taxable profits, not one-half as assumed by Kopcke,
would not seem to have much to do with the marginal tax rate on the
income from new investment. Firms undertaking new investment may
hardly be expected to plan higher dividend payments as a consequence.
And if they did, the reduced marginal tax rate that they anticipate
should be applied to the present value of the associated added depreci-
ation allowances which would be tied to the new investment. And I
might add again that it is capital gains, and in large part untaxed, "un-
realized" capital gains, which are the dominant reward to investors sup-
plying equity capital, not dividends.
My own conclusion, based partly on my own priors and estimates
of the elasticity of the demand for capital with respect to its cost, is that
Treasury I, and the new House of Representatives version of tax reform,
would have had little effect upon the aggregate of business investment.
Either one would be beneficial in making tax treatment of investment
more neutral and therefore on balance making the investment undertak-
en much more productive.
Treasury II was actually, under reasonable inflation assumptions,
more favorable in its tax treatment to investment than even ACRS, now
appropriately, if belatedly, widely maligned. Treasury presentations of
implications of Treasury II’s depreciation provisions had been unfortunate-
ly misleading in failing to make clear the huge benefits to taxpayers, and
losses to the Treasury, resulting from the combination of inflation adjust-
ments and the retreat from the economic depreciation of Treasury I.
Whether this or any other moves to maintain or enlarge investment
"incentives" will do much for investment, I quite doubt. Their major
effect would be to line the pockets of those who might otherwise pay
business taxes and their owners.
But after all, is that not their real purpose?